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Sometimes a Lawsuit is the Best Answer

An 8.5-year drought assumed since 1992 sizes San Francisco's capital plan, and twenty-six Bay Area water agencies pay for the plan with no vote on it. When the seller skips the meeting and the buyers' agency holds no veto, who can make it show its work?

Alan Forester-Kaiser ·

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On the evening of November 16, 2026, Palo Alto’s City Council and its Utilities Advisory Commission held a joint study session on water supply. The seller of that water, the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, had been invited and did not come.

The staff report explains why in a footnote the vice mayor read aloud: as a regional provider, the SFPUC “prefers to engage collectively with wholesale water customers.” Its customer, as far as it is concerned, is the Bay Area Water Supply and Conservation Agency, BAWSCA, and the city that buys the water is a member of the crowd behind it.

In brief. San Francisco sizes its water system against an 8.5-year design drought, and twenty-six agencies, Palo Alto among them, pay for the result without a vote on the assumption. The buyers’ agency can ask and cannot veto, the seller skipped the meeting, and no state office stands over both governments. Of the buyers’ options, only arbitration and a lawsuit can compel anything, and neither reaches the assumption itself. The options are laid out in a table below.

The subject of the session was a number.

A number set in 1992

SFPUC plans its supply against a design drought of 8.5 years, an assumption city staff say has been in place since 1992. Peter Drekmeier of the Tuolumne River Trust called it an outlier, about two and a half years longer than other drought plans use. He said SFPUC’s own long-term vulnerability assessment found no change in mean annual precipitation and modeled nothing as severe. Other speakers disagreed with him, and nothing at the meeting settled it. The dispute is about the assumption, and in the end about who gets to test it.

The assumption has consequences. In staff’s account, it and the state’s Bay-Delta Plan shape the dry-year supply projections the buyers’ own water plans use. In Drekmeier’s, it leads to proposed alternative-supply projects priced from $17 billion to $25 billion, set against demand that has stayed under 200 million gallons a day for about twelve years. SFPUC’s update of its alternative water supply plan is due in 2027, and the big spending is not planned until the mid-2030s.

From assumption to bill

The path from the number to a household’s bill is short.

A longer design drought means more insurance against shortage: new sources, new storage, new connections. Under the buyers’ agreement with San Francisco, the wholesale customers pay a share of new regional assets in proportion to their use of the system. The SFPUC adds the cost to its wholesale revenue requirement and divides the requirement by the water it expects to sell, to get the per-unit part of the rate. Its schedule for wholesale customers, W-25, charges $6.23 per hundred cubic feet as of July 1, 2026, up from $5.67 in fiscal 2025 and $5.80 the year after, according to Palo Alto’s own rate schedules.

Here the trap closes. The region has cut its use, so the sales on the bottom of the fraction shrink while the costs on the top grow, and the price per unit rises. A commissioner put it in a phrase: the numerator rises while the denominator falls. Drekmeier called it a death spiral, and a council member used the term too. A city that conserved because it was asked to finds itself paying more for having done so, and its residents can’t see the reason from the bill.

Who decides

The contract uses the design drought as a yardstick. San Francisco agrees to use its best efforts to find dry-year supplies sufficient to hold a system-wide shortage to no more than 20 percent in any year of the design drought. The assumption therefore sizes both the obligation and the capital plan that pays for it.

The buyers’ role in setting it is thin. They and BAWSCA may “review and provide written or oral comments” on the level-of-service goals and the ten-year capital plan, and the agreement gives them no veto. BAWSCA’s chief executive said as much to the council: it can request and work behind the scenes, and on the capital projects “there’s no veto.” He sent a letter, dated the twelfth, asking SFPUC to review the severity and length of the drought. SFPUC might keep its assumptions, find a shorter drought, or find a worse one.

A commissioner asked what a review accomplishes if SFPUC doesn’t agree to it. The vice mayor said the council had never held a formal discussion of the design drought until this session.

What the buyers can do

Palo Alto can write a letter. It can ask the BAWSCA board to put the matter on its agenda again, which the mayor said it will do if SFPUC’s reply is unsatisfactory. It can talk to its state legislators, whom speakers named. It can hire its own analyst, which staff said would need unbudgeted money and is hard to do when the consulting firms also work for SFPUC. A commissioner asked what leaving BAWSCA would involve, and the transcript I have shows no answer.

Each of these asks. None compels.

Nor is there a state office to take the dispute to. As far as I can find, California has no standing body that mediates between its own governments. The Office of Administrative Hearings sells mediation and arbitration to state and local agencies, but only to agencies that choose to use it, and I found no program built for one agency’s dispute with another. The state water board decides water rights, and the Public Utilities Commission regulates privately owned utilities, not a city’s. Two governments that disagree and answer to no common authority are left with the contract, the courts, and the Legislature.

What the contract and the courts offer

The contract does carry some force. Under Section 8.01, questions about the wholesale revenue requirement, SFPUC’s accounting and its classification of new assets go to a single arbitrator, and are barred from court. Any wholesale customer may demand that arbitration, alone, within twelve months of the audit report for the year. Everything else in the agreement is “subject to judicial determination.” The agreement also leaves the structure of the rate schedule to SFPUC, so long as it is not “arbitrary, unreasonable, or unjustly discriminatory.”

None of this reaches the design drought directly. It is a planning judgment, and a court is likely to defer to an agency on a technical judgment unless someone shows the agency did not reason its way to it. What the buyers can reach is its price tag: how the costs it produces are classified, and whether they belong in the requirement at all. An arbitrator can order that recalculated. A lawsuit is the heavier tool, and its real use here would be to make the SFPUC produce the studies behind the number and answer for them in front of someone with no stake in the result. I can’t say how a court would rule, and a suit costs money, time and goodwill with a seller the cities depend on.

That is still a different thing from what the buyers have now, which is a request. Lawsuits already figure in this story, though others have brought them. The 1984 agreement that preceded this one settled a civil action by some of the wholesale customers, who claimed under the federal Raker Act the right to water at cost. The present agreement reserves those claims and bars them “during the Term,” which ends in 2034. BAWSCA and SFPUC lost a suit against the state’s Bay-Delta Plan in 2024, and it is on appeal, and the Sierra Club has challenged SFPUC’s urban water management plan. In both, a court is deciding questions about the system’s water without hearing the buyers’ complaint about the assumption.

The buyers also hold a lever with a date on it. The term can be extended only if, in the first half of 2032, customers representing two-thirds in number and 75 percent of the water delivered accept San Francisco’s offer. A seller that wants its largest customers to renew has reason to answer them before then.

The options at a glance

Option What it can force Needs SFPUC’s consent? Main limit
Letter asking for a review (BAWSCA, sent the 12th) Nothing; SFPUC may keep, shorten or lengthen the drought Yes Already sent; no reply yet
BAWSCA board, put the item back on its agenda A public airing among the 26 buyers No No veto under the contract
State legislators A bill, an audit request, public pressure No Needs a champion; slow
Palo Alto’s own analyst The city’s own numbers No Unbudgeted; consultants also work for SFPUC
Arbitration, Section 8.01 Recalculation of the revenue requirement, accounting and asset classification; binding No; any one customer may demand it Not the drought itself; twelve-month deadline
Lawsuit Disclosure of the studies behind the number; a ruling on whether the reasoning was arbitrary or unreasonable No Courts defer on planning; costly; goodwill
2032 renewal vote Leverage, since extension needs two-thirds of customers by number and 75 percent by volume No Years away
Leaving BAWSCA Freedom to act alone No The council has not been told what it would cost
State mediator (Office of Administrative Hearings) Mediation, if both sides agree Yes No program found for agency-against-agency disputes

Who is in charge

A decision that sets a city’s water bill for a generation was made elsewhere, in a place the city had no part in, and the council discussed it formally for the first time this month. That is the shape of a framework without representation. Those who pay the rate and conserve to reduce it don’t set the assumption and can’t compel the people who do. The agency created to speak for them can speak.

A fair arrangement would give the buyers a role in testing the number that the seller can’t decline: an independent review whose findings bind, a seat when the assumption is reviewed, or terms in the contract that a court can enforce. The contract runs to 2034, and 2032 is when the buyers are asked to renew.


Sources

  • City of Palo Alto, City Council meeting of November 16, 2026, joint study session with the Utilities Advisory Commission on water supply reliability (video, summary at on40.org, transcript at Transparent Cities; the transcript’s speaker labels are machine-generated)
  • Palo Alto staff report for that session, including the footnote on SFPUC’s preference to engage wholesale customers collectively
  • Bay Area Water Supply and Conservation Agency (BAWSCA), presentation and letter to SFPUC on the design drought
  • Tuolumne River Trust, presentation on Bay-Delta ecosystem decline, SFPUC demand projections and the design drought
  • 2021 Amended and Restated Water Supply Agreement between the City and County of San Francisco and the wholesale customers (BAWSCA), sections 2.01, 2.02, 3.11, 5.04, 6.03, 6.04, 6.09, 8.01 and 8.07
  • SFPUC, Rate Schedules & Fees for Water and Sewer Service, fiscal years 2026-27 and 2027-28, Schedule W-25; City of Palo Alto water rate schedules W-1 and W-4 (pass-through of the SFPUC wholesale charge)
  • San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, Hetch Hetchy Regional Water System

A note on how this piece was written: the thesis and direction are mine. The sentences were drafted with AI assistance from that direction and from the public record of the November 16 meeting and the Water Supply Agreement, and then edited by hand. I’d rather say that plainly than have a reader guess at it. The figures quoted from presenters are their claims, and the status of the two lawsuits comes from a speaker’s account. Still to check: how a court or arbitrator would treat the design drought and its capital costs; whether OAH accepts agency-versus-agency mediation, and the state offices described as lacking such a role; whether Palo Alto was a plaintiff in the pre-1984 suit. I read about two-thirds of the transcript, and some speakers are identified by role because the labels are unreliable.

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