Social LibertySocial Liberty

Confederalism and State Power

Alan Forester-Kaiser ·

Above all, I have tried to show in my previous writings how confederation on a municipal basis has existed in sharp tension with the centralized state generally, and the nation-state of recent times. Confederalism, I have tried to emphasize, is not simply a unique societal, particularly civic or municipal, form of administration. It is a […]

Confederalism and Interdependence

Alan Forester-Kaiser ·

Decentralism and self-sustainability must involve a much broader principle of social organization than mere localism. Together with decentralization, approximations to self-sufficiency, humanly scaled communities, ecotechnologies, and the like, there is a compelling need for democratic and truly communitarian forms of interdependence — in short, for libertarian forms of confederalism. I have detailed at length in […]

Decentralism and Self Sustainability

Alan Forester-Kaiser ·

The assumption that what currently exists must necessarily exist is the acid that corrodes all visionary thinking (as witness the recent tendency of radicals to espouse “market socialism” rather than deal with the failings of the market economy as well as state socialism). Doubtless we will have to import coffee for those people who need […]

Confederalism

Alan Forester-Kaiser ·

Murray Bookchin Few arguments have been used more effectively to challenge the case for face-to-face participatory democracy than the claim that we live in a “complex society.” Modern population centers, we are told, are too large and too concentrated to allow for direct decision-making at a grassroots level. And our economy is too “global,” presumably, […]

Adopting a Bill

Alan Forester-Kaiser ·

In a DAO Democracy, how do we propose a bill, and how does it get adopted? Initially, anyone can propose a bill. It can be submitted at any time. If the prediction market says it has a positive impact on the collective welfare, it is adopted. If not, it is not. If the bill is […]

Deployment of DAO Democracy

Alan Forester-Kaiser ·

If we grant that the final result is desirable, how might it be achieved? What are the paths from the world as it exists today to this future, better world where sound governance is the rule and not the exception? An existing organization might already be taking an annual poll of its members, and if […]

A Few Characteristics of Self Improving DAO Democracies

Alan Forester-Kaiser ·

Anyone can propose a bill at any time. All proposals are reviewed equally, without bias. Proposals that improve the general welfare (according to the prediction market’s evaluation of the publicly known metric for the general welfare) will be adopted. The mechanism by which bills are reviewed is open to all. Anyone can investigate and present […]

The Darwin of DAO

Alan Forester-Kaiser ·

While we have considered DAO’s as a base for a stable democracy, it is apparent that they can serve as a base for any computation. Further, given the persistence of a successful DAO (the DAO for Bitcoin has persisted since January 3rd, 2009), it seems inevitable that Darwinian selection will be applied quite vigorously to […]

The End of the World Problem

Alan Forester-Kaiser ·

A problem that might occur with prediction markets and governmental policies might be described as the End of the World problem. Suppose we are evaluating a policy that is very good, but has the small problem that is has a 20% probability of causing the end of the world. Normally, if a prediction market is […]

Electing the President

Alan Forester-Kaiser ·

Most democracies have an Executive Officer, such as the President of the United States, typically elected either directly or indirectly by the people. In a DAO Democracy, assuming we retain the Executive Branch in more or less its current form, the simplest approach would be to appoint, as President, that person the prediction market said […]

Membership

Alan Forester-Kaiser ·

Another problem with evaluating collective welfare is membership in the collective: who do we add and who do we remove? We consider criteria that are suitable for membership in a nation (in contrast with membership in the local chess club, or a student in a school, or a shareholder in a company). Traditionally, for democracies, children of […]

Trading Democratic Collective Welfare

Alan Forester-Kaiser ·

We now give an example of how to buy and sell DCWi in a prediction market. First, a trader purchases a pair of conditional bearer bonds from a bank for $1 in the year 2016. The first says “Pay to bearer $1 times DCW2016” The second says “Pay to bearer $1 times (1-DCW2016)”. Because DCW2016 is between […]